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occurs at the time a petitioner is notified of the results of an appeal ' ,
are inapposite, since, in those cases, the individual petitioner knew
that he was "aggrieved" immediately upon notification without ref-
erence to his status in relation to other appellants. 51 In Martin,
however, the purpose of the senior dispatcher examination was to
determine a list of promotable employees, and a "final and binding"
result could not be reached until the list was issued. Thus, the
Martin decision represents an application of traditional article 78
principles to those narrow circumstances in which the effect of an
appeal determination on the petitioner depends upon the di'sposi-
tion of other appeals.
Marian A. Campbell
ARTICLE 10-PARTIES GENERALLY
CPLR 1012: Stockholder allowed to appeal dismissal of derivative
action although not a party to action at trial stage
CPLR 1012 grants a nonparty the right to intervene in an action
"[u]pon timely motion, . . .when the representation of [his] in-
terest is or may be inadequate and [he] is or may be bound by the
judgment.""5 While the statute has been construed to give courts
11 Munice v. Board of Examiners, 31 N.Y.2d 683, 289 N.E.2d 179, 337 N.Y.S.2d 258
(1972) (mem.); Presti v. Board of Examiners, 71 Misc. 2d 232, 336 N.Y.S.2d 171 (Sup. Ct.
Kings County 1968); Chavich v. Board of Examiners, 43 Misc. 2d 1090, 252 N.Y.S.2d 718
(Sup. Ct. Kings County 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 23 App. Div. 2d 57, 258 N.Y.S.2d 677
(2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 16 N.Y.2d 810, 210 N.E.2d 359, 263 N.Y.S.2d 7 (1965); Furman v.
Marsh, 185 Misc. 209, 56 N.Y.S.2d 690 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1945).
51 In the typical situation, when a terminated employee learns that his appeal for rein-
statement has been denied, he is clearly aware that he has been aggrieved. See, e.g., McGirr
v. Division of Veterans Affairs, 43 N.Y.2d 635, 374 N.E.2d 123, 403 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1978);
Walling v. Schechter, 9 Misc. 2d 621, 167 N.Y.S.2d 861 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1957), aff'd
mem., 8 App. Div. 2d 605, 185 N.Y.S.2d 735 (ist Dep't), aff'd mem., 7 N.Y.2d 814, 164 N.E.2d
716, 196 N.Y.S.2d 695 (1959); cf. Bishop v. Allen, 5 Misc. 2d 676, 165 N.Y.S.2d 813 (Sup.
Ct. Albany County 1956) (action final when agency denied appeal of decision placing peti-
tioner at lower pay scale). Similarly, dismissal of an appeal challenging an administrative
determination which denies the petitioner an opportunity to take a promotional examination
immediately informs the petitioner that he has been adversely affected. See, e.g., Mallen v.
Morton, 199 Misc. 2d 805, 99 N.Y.S.2d 521 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1950); Hecht v. Kern, 178
Misc. 571, 34 N.Y.S.2d 794 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1942). Even where an appeal is brought
seeking review of a civil service examination, denial of such appeal is considered a final and
binding determination if the petitioner knows at the time that the grade he received will not
qualify him for the position being offered. See, e.g., Greenbaum v. Ingraham, 48 App. Div.
2d 969, 369 N.Y.S.2d 556 (3d Dep't 1975); Keays v. Conway, 105 N.Y.S.2d 944 (Sup. Ct.
Albany County 1951); cf. Abramson v. Commissioner of Educ., 1 App. Div. 2d 366, 150
N.Y.S.2d 270 (3d Dep't 1956) (order became final and binding when persons affected by
rescission of 5% credit were notified).
CPLR 1012 (a)(2) (1976). See generally 2 WK&M 1012.01-.08.
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considerable discretion in determining whether an intervention
motion is "timely,"59 there has been a general reluctance to permit
intervention after judgment has been entered at the trial court
level.' Recently, however, in Auerbach v. Bennett,"' the Appellate
Division, Second Department, ruled that where the stockholder who
brought a derivative action refuses to appeal an adverse judgment,
a stockholder who was not a party to the original action may inter-
vene and take an appeal."2
Plaintiff Auerbach brought a derivative action 3 against the
board of directors of a corporation in which he owned stock, alleging
5, See Krenitsky v. Ludlow Motor Co., 276 App. Div. 511, 513-14, 96 N.Y.S.2d 102, 104-
05 (3d Dep't 1950); 2 WK&M 1012.06; cf. Meyer v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 228 App. Div.
641, 238 N.Y.S. 48 (2d Dep't 1929) (per curiam) (right to intervene is subject to court's
discretion).
" 2 WK&M 1012.07; see, e.g., 128 Willow Assocs. v. Yoswein, 50 App. Div. 2d 551, 375
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1st Dep't 1975); White v. Globe Indem. Co., 14 App. Div. 2d 743, 220
N.Y.S.2d 37 (1st Dep't 1961) (per curiam); Krenitsky v. Ludlow Motor Co., 276 App. Div.
511, 514, 96 N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (3d Dep't 1950). Post-judgment intervention has been permit-
ted in only a few cases. See Ginsberg v. Lomenzo, 23 N.Y.2d 94, 242 N.E.2d 734, 295 N.Y.S.2d
475, revg per curiam 30 App. Div. 2d 982, 294 N.Y.S.2d 201 (3d Dep't 1968); Soto v. Lenscraft
Optical Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 747, 162 N.E.2d 740, 193 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1959); Unitarian Universalist
Church v. Shorten, 64 Misc. 2d 851, 315 N.Y.S.2d 506, vacated on other grounds, 64 Misc.
2d 1027, 316 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970). The hesitancy with which courts
grant post-judgment intervention reflects the view that a person should not be permitted to
reap the benefits of a lawsuit in which he has not participated. See 2 WK&M 1012.07.
" 64 App. Div. 2d 98, 408 N.Y.S.2d 83 (2d Dep't 1978).
12 Id. at 106, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
13 The nature of a stockholder's derivative action has been defined as follows:
The contrasting difference between a stockholder's suit for his corporation and
a suit by him against it, is crucial. In the former, he has no claim of his own; he
merely has a personal controversy with his corporation regarding the business wis-
dom or legal basis for the latter's assertion of a claim against third parties. What-
ever money or property is to be recovered would go to the corporation, not a fraction
of it to the stockholder. When such a suit is entertained, the stockholder is in effect
allowed to conscript the corporation as a complainant on a claim that the corpora-
tion, in the exercise of what it asserts to be its uncoerced discretion, is unwilling to
initiate. This is a wholly different situation from that which arises when the corpo-
ration is charged with invasion of the stockholder's independent right.
Smith v. Sperling, 354 U.S. 91, 99 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see Carruthers v. Jack
Waite Mining Co., 306 N.Y. 136, 140, 116 N.E.2d 286, 288 (1953); Teich v. Lawrence, 291
N.Y. 245, 249, 52 N.E.2d 115, 116 (1943) (per curiam); Fifty States Management Corp. v.
Niagara Permanent Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 58 App. Div. 2d 177, 179, 396 N.Y.S.2d 925, 927 (4th
Dep't 1977). Derivative actions brought in New York courts are governed by N.Y. Bus. CoRP.
LAw §§ 626-627 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1978-1979). The basic requirements for bringing
such an action are that the plaintiff be a stockholder, both at the "time of bringing the action
and. . .at the time of the transaction of which he complains," that previous attempts have
been made to "secure the initiation of such action by the board," or reasons have been offered
to explain why such attempts were not made. Id. § 626(b)-(c). Under certain circumstances,
the plaintiff may be required to furnish security to cover the reasonable expenses incurred in
the action by the corporation. Id. § 627. A derivative action cannot be terminated prior to
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that the directors permitted payments of more than $11,000,000 in
bribes and kickbacks, and then failed to seek recovery of them.64
The Auerbach complaint, seeking an accounting and recovery on
behalf of the corporation,"5 was dismissed when the defendants suc-
cessfully moved for summary judgment. 6 After the dismissal, Wal-
lenstein, a stockholder who had commenced an independent deriva-
tive action, asked Auerbach to take an appeal. 7 When Auerbach
refused, Wallenstein filed a notice of appeal himself.8 The defen-
judgment without court approval, and approval may not be granted if the court finds that
the "interests of the shareholders or any classes thereof will be substantially affected" by such
termination. Id. § 626(d). Upon an award of damages, the plaintiff in a derivative action is
entitled only to reasonable expenses incurred in pursuing the action. The remainder of the
judgment goes to the corporation. Id. § 626(e).
11 64 App. Div. 2d at 102, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 84. The derivative action in Auerbach was
brought on behalf of General Telephone & Electronics Corp. (GTE) after the corporation's
audit committee issued a report disclosing the existence of illegal domestic and foreign pay-
ments. Id. In addition to suing the individual directors of GTE, the plaintiff sought recovery
from the corporation's auditor, Arthur Andersen & Co., for negligently failing to discover and
report the illegal payments. Id. at 102 & n.1, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 84 & n.1.
Id. at 102, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 84. Auerbach's lawsuit was one of six that were initiated
when the existence of illegal payments was revealed. Id. at 102 & nn.2-3, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 84
& nn.2-3. Following the commencement of these suits, GTE's board of directors established
a litigation committee to investigate the facts underlying the plaintiffs' allegations. The
committee consisted of three directors, two of whom had been appointed to the board after
the payments in question were made. Former Chief Judge Charles S. Desmond was appointed
counsel to the committee. Id. at 102, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85. After its investigation, the commit-
tee reported that it had found no evidence of bad faith on the part of either the directors or
Arthur Andersen & Co. Concluding that the allegations were without merit, the committee
noted that, even if they were true, it would not serve GTE's best interests to prosecute an
action. Id. at 102-03, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
" Id. at 103, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85. Basing its findings upon the report prepared by the
litigation committee, see note 65 supra, the lower court concluded that the derivative suit
could not be maintained over the objection of corporate management. Invoking the "business
judgment" doctrine, the lower court apparently found that "a decision made in good faith
by a disinterested and independent board committee that the pursuit of a derivative action
against erring directors and officers would not be in the best interests of the corporation
[could not] be challenged by the stockholders." 64 App. Div. 2d at 103, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
The "business judgment" doctrine, which operates to insulate the acts of corporate directors,
has been explained in the following manner:
Under the business judgment doctrine, acts of directors, within the powers of the
corporation, in the furtherance of its business, made in good faith and in the
exercise of an honest judgment, are valid and conclude the corporation and its
shareholders. Questions of management policy, contract expediency and adequate
consideration are left to their honest and unselfish decision, judgment and discre-
tion and may not be interfered with or restrained.
Heimann v. American Express Co., 53 Misc. 2d 749, 763, 279 N.Y.S.2d 867, 881 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1967). See also Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721 (1912);
Ferguson v. Fergus Enterprises, Inc., 13 Misc. 2d 235, 175 N.Y.S.2d 974 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1958).
" 64 App. Div. 2d at 103, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85.
" Id.; see CPLR 5513(a) (1978). One court has held that the time within which an appeal
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dants sought a dismissal of the appeal, contending that Wallenstein
was not an aggrieved party and, therefore, he lacked standing to
appeal." Wallenstein countered by moving for leave to intervene in
the action nunc pro tunc.10
The Appellate Division, Second Department, refused to dismiss
the appeal and instead granted Wallenstein's motion for interven-
tion as of right."1 The Auerbach court initially considered the res-
pondents' contention that the appeal was barred by CPLR 5511,
which permits appeals only by "aggrieved parties. ",' 2 Justice Hop-
kins, writing for a unanimous panel, 3 noted that a derivative action
is similar to a class action in that a judgment is binding on all
must be filed does not begin until the motion to intervene has been granted. See Unitarian
Universalist Church v. Shorten, 64 Misc. 2d 851, 856, 315 N.Y.S.2d 506, 513, vacated on other
grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 1027, 316 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1970).
11 64 App. Div. 2d at 103, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85; see note 72 and accompanying text infra.
70 64 App. Div. 2d at 103, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85. Both Wallenstein's and the defendants'
motions were denied, although leave was granted for their renewal at the argument of the
appeal. Each side renewed its motions at that time. Id.
11 Id. at 105, 109, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87-88.
72 CPLR 5511 (1978) provides:
An aggrieved party or a person substituted for him may appeal from any
appealable judgment or order except one entered upon the default of the aggrieved
party. He shall be designated as the appellant and the adverse party as the respon-
dent.
A person is aggrieved within the meaning of CPLR 5511 when a judgment or order "has a
binding force against the rights, person or property of the party seeking to appeal." Grabb v.
Nicholas, 2 App. Div. 2d 446, 447-48, 156 N.Y.S.2d 685, 687 (4th Dep't 1956) (per curiam);
accord, Ross v. Wigg, 100 N.Y. 243, 246, 3 N.E. 180, 181 (1885); In re Richmond County Soc'y
for Prevention of Cruelty to Children, 11 App. Div. 2d 236, 239, 204 N.Y.S.2d 707, 711 (2d
Dep't 1960) (per curiam). Thus, standing to appeal is seldom granted to a nonparty since a
nonparty rarely is bound by the outcome of litigation. 7 WK&M 5511.04; see, e.g., Kipbea
Baking Co. v. Strauss, 10 App. Div. 2d 987, 202 N.Y.S.2d 793 (2d Dep't 1960); Trans-Canada
Assurance Agencies, Inc. v. City of Mechanicville, 2 App. Div. 2d 734, 152 N.Y.S.2d 608 (3d
Dep't 1956); Ferris v. Agostinelli, 249 App. Div. 638, 291 N.Y.S.2d 668 (2d Dep't 1936) (per
curiam). The term party, however, has been construed "not [to] preclude an appeal by
persons aggrieved, who, though not strictly parties, are so connected with the litigation that
they may be termed quasi parties." Ryder v. Cue Car Rental, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 143, 146,
302 N.Y.S.2d 17, 20 (4th Dep't 1969) (quoting 10 CARmODY-WAIT 2d § 70:69, at 342 (1966)).
Indeed, the courts have been liberal in conferring standing to appeal upon nonparties ad-
versely affected by judgments. See, e.g., Doundoulakis v. Town of Hempstead, 51 App. Div.
2d 302, 381 N.Y.S.2d 287 (2d Dep't 1976), rev'd on other grounds, 42 N.Y.2d 440, 368 N.E.2d
24, 398 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1977); Sherman v. Morales, 50 App. Div. 2d 610, 375 N.Y.S.2d 377 (2d
Dep't 1975) (mei.); People v. Dobbs Ferry Medical Pavillion, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 324, 340
N.Y.S.2d 108 (2d Dep't), aff'd mem., 33 N.Y.2d 584,301 N.E.2d 435,347 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1973);
Ryder v. Cue Car Rental, Inc., 32 App. Div. 2d 143, 302 N.Y.S.2d 17 (4th Dep't 1969); Grabb
v. Nicholas, 2 App. Div. 2d 446, 156 N.Y.S.2d 685 (4th Dep't 1956) (per curiam); Posen v.
Cowdin, 267 App. Div. 158, 44 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1st Dep't 1943) (per curiam); In re Estate of
Mistrett, 75 Misc. 2d 377, 347 N.Y.S.2d 805 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1973).
" Justice Hopkins was joined in his opinion by Justices Latham, Suozzi and Rabin.
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stockholders, whether or not they were parties to the action.74 Ob-
serving that, under prior case law, nonparties had been permitted
to appeal judgments that adversely affected them,75 the court found
that the res judicata effect of Auerbach's derivative action was suffi-
cient to justify according Wallenstein "appellant status. '76
Turning to Wallenstein's motion to intervene, the court analog-
ized a derivative action to a class action in its effect on other mem-
bers of the class, engrafting the class action requirement of "fair and
adequate representation of the members of the class" onto deriva-
tive actions. 77 The court noted that, when the stockholder who
brings an action chooses not to appeal an adverse judgment, the
court may permit another stockholder to intervene for the purpose
of taking an appeal.78 Acknowledging that intervention is not nor-
mally permitted after the entry of judgment at trial,7 9 Justice Hop-
kins nevertheless found that post-judgment intervention was appro-
priate under the "unusual circumstances" present in the case."0
While the original plaintiff could not be compelled to take an ap-
peal, Justice Hopkins reasoned, "he should not be allowed to en-
large his lack of enthusiasm into an insurmountable barrier against
others of the class readier to take up the cudgels."'"
71 64 App. Div. 2d at 104, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 86; see Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading
Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 269 N.Y.S. 360 (2d Dep't 1934); Gerith Realty Corp. v. Normandie
Nat'l Sec. Corp., 154 Misc. 615, 276 N.Y.S. 655 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1933), aff'd mem.,
241 App. Div. 717, 269 N.Y.S. 1007 (1st Dep't 1934), aff'd mem., 266 N.Y. 525, 195 N.E. 183
(1935); cf. Sylvander v. Farmers & Traders Life Ins. Co., 21 App. Div. 2d 851, 251 N.Y.S.2d
298 (4th Dep't 1964) (outcome of prior action not binding with respect to issues of fact not
previously litigated); Darraugh v. Carrington, 50 N.Y.S.2d 481 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1944),
aff'd per curiam, 270 App. Div. 932, 62 N.Y.S.2d 241 (1st Dep't 1946) (outcome of first action
res judicata only with respect to issues litigated).
11 64 App. Div. 2d at 104, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 85 (citing People v. Dobbs Ferry Medical
Pavillion, Inc., 40 App. Div. 2d 324, 325, 340 N.Y.S.2d 108, 110 (2d Dep't), aff'd, 33 N.Y.2d
584, 301 N.E.2d 435, 347 N.Y.S.2d 452 (1973)). The court stated that the true test is "whether
the nonparty may be bound by the judgment if he does not take affirmative action in the
litigation to protect his rights." 64 App. Div. 2d at 104, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 86 (citations omitted).
64 App. Div. 2d at 101, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 84.
64 App. Div. 2d at 104, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 86. Federal and state class action statutes both
require that all class members be fairly and adequately represented. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(4);
CPLR 901(a) (4) (1976). There is no similar requirement, however, in derivative actions at the
state level, although the federal statute expressly mandates fair and adequate representation.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23.1(2); see N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 626 (McKinney 1963).
11 64 App. Div. 2d at 105, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 86.
7g Id.; see note 60 supra.
64 App. Div. 2d at 105, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 86; accord, Krenitsky v. Ludlow Motor Co.,
276 App. Div. 511, 514, 96 N.Y.S.2d 102, 105 (3d Dep't 1950). The court noted that a motion
for intervention is a matter for judicial discretion. 64 App. Div. 2d at 105, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
86.
" 64 App. Div. 2d at 105, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 86. Having granted Wallenstein permission
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Auerbach represents the first case in which a New York appel-
late court has considered the problems created by the refusal of a
party to appeal an adverse judgment that binds similarly situated
nonparties.82 It appears, however, that the court's grant of Wallen-
to intervene and take the appeal, the Auerbach court considered the action on its merits. The
court reversed special term's grant of summary judgment, finding that the lower court erred
in invoking the business judgment doctrine prior to the discovery and deposition stages of
the action. Id. at 108, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88; see note 66 supra. Justice Hopkins noted that,
although the doctrine is often applied to insulate corporate directors' acts, it may not be
utilized when their good faith is at issue. 64 App. Div. 2d at 106, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87; accord,
Koral v. Savory, Inc., 276 N.Y. 215, 217, 11 N.E.2d 883, 885 (1937); cf. Ripley v. International
Rys. of Cent. America, 8 App. Div. 2d 310, 317, 188 N.Y.S.2d 62, 72 (1st Dep't 1959), affl'd, 8
N.Y.2d 430, 171 N.E.2d 443, 209 N.Y.S.2d 289 (1960) (refusal of corporation to sue effective
only if "based on the exercise of discretion or business judgment"); Syracuse Television, Inc.
v. Channel 9, Syracuse, Inc., 51 Misc. 2d 188, 194, 273 N.Y.S.2d 16, 25 (Sup. Ct. Onondaga
County 1966) (demand that a corporation sue "must be met by a wrongful refusal"). See
generally 3A W. FrnrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PmVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (rev.
perm. ed. 1975). Rejecting the respondents' contention that good faith was conclusively
established by the findings of the litigation committee, see note 65 supra, the Auerbach court
found that there were sufficient indicia of the directors' bad faith to preclude summary
judgment "practically at the pleading stage." 64 App. Div. 2d at 108, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88.
Particularly persuasive to the Auerbach court was that, although the litigation committee
itself had been satisfied that the defendants had acted in good faith, the committee report
contained substantial evidence of wrongdoing. See id. at 106, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87. The court
also suggested that, despite the fact that the directors who made the report were unconnected
to the topic of investigation, they might have great difficulty overcoming a natural hesitancy
to implicate their fellow directors. Ird. at 107, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 88. See also Nutt, A Study of
Mutual Fund Independent Directors, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 179, 216 (1971). Relying upon the
resolution of a recently decided federal case with nearly identical facts, Lasker v. Burks, 567
F.2d 1208 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3221 (Oct. 2, 1978), the court stated that
"summary judgment which ends a derivative action at the threshold, before the plaintiff has
been afforded the opportunity of pretrial discovery and examination before trial, should not
be the means of foreclosing a nonfrivolous action." 64 App. Div. 2d at 107-08, 408 N.Y.S.2d
at 88. Thus, the Auerbach court has limited the scope of the business judgment doctrine to
situations in which preliminary judicial fact finding takes place and the possibility of bad
faith has been excluded. See Fox, Nonparty Stockholder Wins Appeal of Derivative Action,
N.Y.L.J., Aug. 14, 1978, at 1, col. 3; see, e.g., Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 124-26,
100 N.E. 721, 723-24 (1912); Chelrob, Inc. v. Barrett, 265 App. Div. 455, 457, 39 N.Y.S.2d
625, 627 (2d Dep't 1943) (per curiam), modified on other grounds, 293 N.Y. 442, 57 N.E.2d
825 (1944); Heimann v. American Express Co., 53 Misc. 2d 749, 763, 279 N.Y.S.2d 867, 881
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1967). Such a conclusion appears sound, since it prevents corporate
directors from foreclosing all derivative actions against them by appointing "disinterested"
committees to attest to their good faith.
" 64 App. Div. 2d at 101, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 84. Standing to appeal a derivative action has
been granted to a nonparty stockholder prior to Auerbach. See Posen v. Cowdin, 267 App.
Div. 158, 44 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1st Dep't 1943) (per curiam). In Posen, the stockholder who
brought the action agreed to a compromise with the respondents. Before approving the com-
promise, the court directed that the nonparty stockholders be given an opportunity to airany
objections. Id. at 159, 44 N.Y.S.2d at 843. The appellant used the opportunity to object, but
the court nevertheless approved the compromise. The objecting stockholdersubsequently was
permitted to appeal after the appellate division found that he had appellate standing under
CPA 557, the predecessor of CPLR 5511. 267 App. Div. at 160, 44 N.Y.S.2d at 843-44. Posen
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stein's motion to intervene was presaged by earlier decisions involv-
ing intervention." Despite the historical bias against permitting an
individual to become a party to an action begun by another,84 the
Auerbach decision is consistent with the modem judicial view that
intervention should be liberally allowed.8 1 Moreover, the case for
allowing post-judgment intervention in derivative actions is partic-
ularly strong when the plaintiff who initiated the suit refuses to
appeal an adverse outcome. In such cases, the policy against permit-
ting interested individuals to wait while another bears the risk and
expense of litigation is not offended, 6 since the need to intervene is
not foreseeable prior to judgment. 87 A rule contrary to that suggested
is distinguishable from Auerbach, however, since the appellant in the former case specifically
qualified as a party by having interposed an objection before the trial court. Id.
A closer question was presented in In re Estate of Mistrett, 75 Misc. 2d 377, 347 N.Y.S.2d
805 (Sur. Ct. Erie County 1973). In Mistrett, the original plaintiff died during the pendency
of an appeal from a judgment dismissing his $20,000 claim against his estranged wife. The
couple's son, who was appointed administrator of the estate, declined to prosecute the appeal,
seeking instead to have his father's accounts settled. Id. at 378, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 806. Without
discussing the effect of CPLR 5511, the Mistrett court held that the testator's other creditors,
who had an interest in seeing the money returned to the estate, had standing to prosecute
the appeal. 75 Misc. 2d at 378, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 806.
See Soto v. Lenscraft Optical Corp., 7 N.Y.2d 747, 162 N.E.2d 740, 193 N.Y.S.2d 655
(1959); Unitarian Universalist Church v. Shorten, 64 Misc. 2d 851, 315 N.Y.S.2d 506,
vacated on other grounds, 64 Misc. 2d 1027, 316 N.Y.S.2d 837 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1970); note 82 supra.
8 See Note, Non-Parties'Right of Appeal in Civil Actions, 48 COLUM. L. REv. 1233, 1234
(1948); 2 WK&M 1012.01.
See, e.g., Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization & As-
sessment, 34 App. Div. 2d 1033, 311 N.Y.S.2d 46 (3d Dep't 1970); In re Eberlin, 18 App. Div.
2d 1068, 239 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1st Dep't 1963) (per curiam); Raymond v. Honeywell, 58 Misc.
2d 903, 297 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct. Duchess County 1968). One court has noted that New
York's provision for intervention as of right was modeled after FED. R. Civ. P. 24, "in an
attempt to further broaden [the] scope and liberalize [the] application" of intervention as
of right. Mann v. Compania Petrolera Trans-Cuba S.A., 17 App. Div. 2d 193, 197, 234
N.Y.S.2d 1001, 1005 (1st Dep't 1962) (citing TwELFtr ANN. REP. N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL 218-32
(1946)).
, While the intervenor in Auerbach had initiated an independent suit prior to the entry
of judgment in the main action, it is submitted that the Auerbach court's reasoning need not
be limited to such a factual situation. There appears to be no reason not to allow any
stockholder to intervene in a derivative action, because the amount of recovery by the corpo-
ration on whose behalf the action is brought will remain constant no matter how many
plaintiffs there are.
17 It is interesting to note that, while the court recognized that earlier intervention would
have helped Wallenstein avoid later controversy, it expressly refused to impose any duty of
earlier intervention upon him:
Doubtless, a consolidation or joint trial of all the stockholders' actions in the
State (or elsewhere, if the procedural machinery were available) predicated on the
alleged wfongful payments would prevent either an unseemly race among compet-
ing stockholders or the abrupt and unreviewable ending of all the actions by an
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in Auerbach would invite collusion between corporate directors and
stockholders, as it would enable directors to squelch litigation by
exerting influence over the party prosecuting it.1
s
John H. Beers
ARTICLE 31-DIscLosuRE
CPLR 3101: Pre-trial disclosure on the issue of child custody in a
,matrimonial action denied
CPLR 3101, New York's disclosure statute, provides that a
party has a right to "all evidence material and necessary in the
prosecution or defense of an action." 9 Notwithstanding this broad
unappealed decision in one action at nisi prius. But neither the stockholder plain-
tiffs, the corporation, nor the defendants have found that remedy appropriate for
one reason or another. In the circumstances, the intervention by Wallenstein should
be permitted and his timely filing of an appeal effectuated by the hearing of the
argument on the merits.
64 App. Div. 2d at 105-06, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 87.
" The potential for collusion between corporate directors and stockholders was described
by the second department over 40 years ago:
It would be very easy for offending officers and directors to obtain a friendly stock-
holder to begin an action and to suppress all information on the subject. The
defendants and not stockholders would then be in control of the litigation. If the
doctrine here advocated by the defendants prevails, all other stockholders are pre-
vented from bringing actions in good faith - unless to their already great difficul-
ties, . . . they must have added the duty of establishing by proof that the first
action is in fact collusive. If other stockholders without intervention rely on the first
action to furnish a remedy to all, then it may be permitted to drag along until the
Statute of Limitations has run and be discontinued on a private settlement or
otherwise; and other stockholders will be left remediless.
Dresdner v. Goldman Sachs Trading Corp., 240 App. Div. 242, 247-48, 269 N.Y.S. 360, 367
(2d Dep't 1934). See generally McLaughlin, Capacity of Plaintiff-Stockholder to Terminate
a Stockholder's Suit, 46 YALE L.J. 421 (1936). The problem discussed by the Dresdner court
has been alleviated to some extent by N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW § 626(d) (McKinney 1963), which
prohibits pre-judgment termination of derivative actions without approval of the trial court.
The dilemma persists, however, in cases such as Auerbach, where the initial plaintiff prose-
cutes the action at the trial level but refuses to pursue a meritorious argument to the appellate
level. It is submitted that the Auerbach holding represents a practical solution in these
situations.
CPLR 3101(a) provides in pertinent part that "[t]here shall be full disclosure of all
evidence material and necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action, regardless of the
burden of proof. ... Under the statute, only privileged matter, attorneys' work product
and materials prepared solely for litigation are specifically exempted from the general rule
of full disclosure. CPLR 3101(b)-(d) (1970). See also note 97 infra.
CPLR 3101(a) was originally enacted as a temporary replacement for its predecessor, §
288 of the Civil Practice Act, ch. 926, [19201 N.Y. Laws 521. Although further study was
contemplated, the original language has never been changed and the legislative intent under-
lying the statute remains unclear. 3A WK&M 3101.01. The courts, however, consistently
